

# Enabling the European hydrogen economy – Executive Summary



March 2021



# Hydrogen demand will be greatest in the industry and chemicals sector, followed by transport and heating

Potential H<sub>2</sub> demand, 2030  
TWh

Potential H<sub>2</sub> demand, 2050  
TWh




Transport Industry & Chemicals Heating

- In 2030, H<sub>2</sub> penetrates otherwise hard-to-abate industrial sectors. Demand in transport and heating is minimal in all scenarios as necessary infrastructure roll-out will not take place in this timeframe.
- In 2050, industry still dominates H<sub>2</sub> demand as other abatement pathways are limited.
- In transport, electrification is more efficient for small vehicles, but for HGVs<sup>1</sup>, mass transport, shipping and aviation, hydrogen-switching<sup>2</sup> occurs, especially in our high case.
- Replacing natural gas with H<sub>2</sub> in heating is possible, but requires widespread infrastructure conversion. In both our low and central scenario, more efficient options like heat pumps prevail.


1) Heavy Good Vehicles 2) Switching to hydrogen or hydrogen-derived fuels

# By allowing the use of all forms of RES and decarbonised electricity to produce hydrogen, the EU will be able to meet its demand

Potential H<sub>2</sub> supply, 2030



Potential H<sub>2</sub> supply, 2050




- By allowing all forms of RES and decarbonised electricity in H<sub>2</sub> production, the EU can meet its H<sub>2</sub> demand in both 2030 and 2050 in our central case.
- The volume of H<sub>2</sub> that could be produced from new-build additional renewable capacity only, which would be compatible with the approach laid out in the RED II directives, will not be sufficient to meet our central demand forecast in either 2030 or 2050.
- Additional volumes of H<sub>2</sub> could be produced from SMR/ATR with CCS. However acceptability and technical feasibility vary greatly across countries and SMR/ATR with CCS is also not the ultimate goal favoured by the EU H<sub>2</sub> strategy.

# By 2050, the levelised cost of hydrogen (LCOH) is lowest when all forms of RES & decarbonised electricity are used


## Average LCOH<sup>1</sup>, 2030

€/kg H<sub>2</sub>, real 2019



## Average LCOH, 2050

€/kg H<sub>2</sub>, real 2019




- In 2030, the average LCOH can be reduced by 18% by utilising all RES and decarbonised electricity, compared to a new-build, additional RES only scenario.
  - This is driven by rapid deployment of electrolyzers which can run at higher load factors, accessing RES and decarbonised grid electricity.
- In 2030, LCOH can also be reduced by considering hydrogen production from SMR/ATR with CCS
- By 2050, using RES and decarbonised electricity for H<sub>2</sub> production is the cheapest available option. Average costs are reduced in all cases as CAPEX costs decrease and electrolyser efficiency increases.

1) The LCOE was used for new-build RES electricity prices and the 20th power percentile was used (as a proxy for when decarbonised generators are setting the grid price) where appropriate Aurora's nuclear capture price forecast.. 2) The LCOH in the new-build RES only scenario is shown for a 50/50 split of electrolyzers that are temporally linked to a specific RES plant and co-located. 3) An EU-ETS carbon price of €38.34/t in 2030 and €71.0/t in 2050 was applied to residual emissions as a result of CCS.

# The levelised cost of imported hydrogen is typically higher than hydrogen produced in the EU

## Levelised cost of delivered hydrogen to Germany, 2030


€/kg H<sub>2</sub>, real 2019



- If new-build additional renewables only were utilised for H<sub>2</sub> production, the EU would face a H<sub>2</sub> supply gap.
- The lowest LCOH delivered to Germany (which has the biggest supply gap) is from Morocco.
- However, Morocco (and other North African countries) will not produce enough H<sub>2</sub> to meet EU demand as decarbonisation of the Moroccan grid is also required if H<sub>2</sub> is to be produced on a level playing field. Thus imports are also considered from Chile and Australia.
- Policymakers will need to consider how to ensure a level playing field between H<sub>2</sub> producers inside and outside of the EU, to ensure H<sub>2</sub> imports are subject to the same traceability criteria.

## Total yearly import costs


billion €, real 2019



1) Preparation for transport includes conversion into ammonia, preparation for delivery includes conversion from ammonia to H<sub>2</sub>. 2) H<sub>2</sub> production costs in Morocco, Australia & Chile were calculated based on a discounted wholesale price. 3) Transport costs assume new-build pipeline

# Considering full life cycle emissions, per unit emissions are lowest when all forms of RES and decarbonised electricity are utilised

### Average lifecycle emissions<sup>1</sup>, 2030

kgCO<sub>2</sub>/ kgH<sub>2</sub>

 Emissions from imports

### Extra cost to avoid per tonne CO<sub>2</sub>, compared to meeting demand with grey hydrogen only<sup>3</sup>

€/ tonne CO<sub>2</sub>

350

194


228

151

62

89

### Average lifecycle emissions<sup>1</sup>, 2050

kgCO<sub>2</sub>/ kgH<sub>2</sub>

- Average full-lifecycle emissions<sup>2</sup> are lowest in a scenario where all forms of renewable and decarbonised electricity are utilised for H<sub>2</sub> production in both 2030 and 2050.
- Emissions from the production and shipping of imported H<sub>2</sub> in new-build RES only scenario are included, assuming 30% import from Australia, 50% from Chile, and 20% from Morocco.
- Average full lifecycle emissions are higher in 2050 compared to 2030, as a higher proportion of H<sub>2</sub> is produced through solar electricity, which has the highest full lifecycle emissions<sup>2</sup> of any technology studied.

1) Including emissions from the production and shipping of imported H<sub>2</sub>. Methane emissions not accounted for. 2) Based on the lifecycle emissions of each technology (including albedo effect) from IPCC figures 3) Assume grey hydrogen LCOH €2.2/kg H<sub>2</sub> in 2030, €2.5/kg H<sub>2</sub> in 2050. Results are calculated dividing total extra costs by CO<sub>2</sub> emission avoided in each scenario.

# A number of critical policy decisions made today will shape how the hydrogen economy evolves over the coming decades

## Key policy decisions

### Types of hydrogen to support

- Current policy, laid out in the RED II directives, focuses on supporting H<sub>2</sub> production from new-build additional RES.
- Aurora's analysis shows this approach means the EU will not meet hydrogen demand in our central case resulting in a reliance on costly imports. Overall emissions and total costs of meeting hydrogen demand will be lower than if a more flexible approach was taken, allowing hydrogen production from all forms of renewable and decarbonised electricity.

### Guarantees of Origin schemes

- GoOs will reallocate costs of decarbonisation to customers willing to pay for it.
- A simplified, technology-agnostic definition of hydrogen for the GoO scheme, based on full life cycle emissions from hydrogen production would minimise emissions, whilst allowing hydrogen demand to be met.
- However, this is not the approach that has been taken by the existing CertifHy scheme.

### Carbon Contracts for Difference

- A well designed subsidy regime for hydrogen would provide payments that reflect the value of abatement of carbon emissions and provide long-term investment certainty.
- There are several key questions that need to be addressed prior to the implementation of such a scheme.

### Demand mandates

- Mandates can be a powerful tool in driving the switch to less-emitting forms of hydrogen.
- Existing regulations, such as demand mandates in fuel, should be modified to allow the use of hydrogen from all forms of res and decarbonised electricity.
- Hydrogen blending into existing gas networks could be an early step on a path towards a wider hydrogen economy, but would be costly and could risk fragmentation of the EU's gas markets.

## General Disclaimer

This document is provided "as is" for your information only and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is given by Aurora Energy Research Limited and its subsidiaries Aurora Energy Research GmbH and Aurora Energy Research Pty Ltd (together, "**Aurora**"), their directors, employees agents or affiliates (together, Aurora's "**Associates**") as to its accuracy, reliability or completeness. Aurora and its Associates assume no responsibility, and accept no liability for, any loss arising out of your use of this document. This document is not to be relied upon for any purpose or used in substitution for your own independent investigations and sound judgment. The information contained in this document reflects our beliefs, assumptions, intentions and expectations as of the date of this document and is subject to change. Aurora assumes no obligation, and does not intend, to update this information.

## Forward-looking statements

This document contains forward-looking statements and information, which reflect Aurora's current view with respect to future events and financial performance. When used in this document, the words "believes", "expects", "plans", "may", "will", "would", "could", "should", "anticipates", "estimates", "project", "intend" or "outlook" or other variations of these words or other similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements and information. Actual results may differ materially from the expectations expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements as a result of known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Known risks and uncertainties include but are not limited to: risks associated with political events in Europe and elsewhere, contractual risks, creditworthiness of customers, performance of suppliers and management of plant and personnel; risk associated with financial factors such as volatility in exchange rates, increases in interest rates, restrictions on access to capital, and swings in global financial markets; risks associated with domestic and foreign government regulation, including export controls and economic sanctions; and other risks, including litigation. The foregoing list of important factors is not exhaustive.

## Copyright

This document and its content (including, but not limited to, the text, images, graphics and illustrations) is the copyright material of Aurora, unless otherwise stated.

**This document is confidential and it may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or in any way used for commercial purposes without the prior written consent of Aurora.**




AURORA



ENERGY RESEARCH

# We have benchmarked our demand forecast against a range of external sources, where available


## Total European hydrogen demand, 2050

TWh H<sub>2</sub>

1) Ambitious case in Hydrogen Roadmap Europe. 2) Business as usual case in Hydrogen Roadmap Europe 3) Agora Energiewende, No-regret Hydrogen report, including only large-scale industrial demand for feedstock and chemical reaction agents.

# A Carbon Contracts for Difference scheme would provide a payment for avoided carbon emissions which could be applied across multiple sectors

Current EU-ETS prices are too low to drive decarbonisation and as future carbon prices are uncertain, securing funding for abatement projects is challenging. CCfDs are designed to hedge against volatile carbon prices. Under a CCfD scheme, investors would be guaranteed a carbon price needed to finance their project.



**How could the carbon strike price be designed?** Sector or project specific CCfDs would be needed, with specific strike prices. A single strike price for all industries would mean for many sectors the strike price would be too low to support decarbonisation.

**How could CCfDs be auctioned?** Sector-specific auctions would fairly allocate CCfDs across all sectors, allowing segments such as steel to realise the full potential of decarbonised H<sub>2</sub>.

**Would a CCfD scheme be implemented at a national or EU level?** A CCfD scheme would likely be implemented at a national level, however efforts would have to be made to ensure compatibility with state aid rules.

**What would the duration of a CCfD be?** CCfD contracts should be designed to cover the full investment period of a project. Decarbonisation of many industrial sectors will introduce high technological and financial risks and support is needed for the entire investment period for a project to be successful.